ABSTRACT: With the introduction of oocyte vitrification, a special form of intergenerational intrafamilial medically assisted reproduction (IMAR) has now become feasible: fertility preservation for mother-to-daughter oocyte donation (FPMDD). For girls diagnosed with premature ovarian insufficiency (POI), banking of their mothers' oocytes can preserve the option of having genetically related offspring. Since policy documents on IMAR do not discuss specific concerns raised by FPMDD, clinicians can feel at a loss for guidance with regard to handling these requests. Through a comparison of FPMDD with reproductive practices in which similar concerns were raised, proportionality of cryopreservation for self-use and pressure to use the oocytes in fertility preservation in minors, we argue that FPMDD can be acceptable under conditions. The paper ends with recommendations for handling FPMDD-requests, including different options for the legal construction of this form of oocyte donation.
Introduction
Premature ovarian insufficiency (POI) is a condition of premature exhaustion of the resting pool of primordial follicles. The disorder usually leads to sterility, and has a large impact on reproductive health when it arises at a young age (De Vos et al., 2010) . In girls and women with Turner syndrome, infertility and the inability to bear one's genetically own children are reported to be the most frequent concerns throughout lifespan, even before short stature (Sutton et al., 2005) . Women with POI can only achieve a pregnancy through oocyte donation with help from an egg bank donor, a friend, sisters or relatives (Webber et al., 2016) .
Nowadays, mothers with daughters diagnosed with POI request oocyte banking for possible future use by their daughter (Dahhan et al., 2015) . In this article, we will refer to these requests as 'fertility preservation for mother-to-daughter donation (FPMDD)'. In the literature, we found only one case of FPMDD: a 33-year-old mother who banked her oocytes with vitrification for later use by her 6-yearold daughter with Turner syndrome (Gidoni et al., 2008) . No earlier case of FPMDD was reported, possibly because slow freezing of oocytes was known to give poor pregnancy chances. The introduction of the vitrification technique now technically enables us to bank oocytes with significantly better pregnancy results compared to slow freezing (Kuwayama et al., 2005; Cobo and Diaz, 2011) .
Requests for FPMDD may both arise when POI has been diagnosed or in view of a high risk of developing POI, as is the case in girls with Turner syndrome. Requests for FPMDD may also arise when POI is the (expected) result of gonadotoxic cancer treatment in cases where no prior fertility preservation measures were taken. In pre-pubertal girls, the most realistic although still experimental fertility preservation option is ovarian tissue cryopreservation (Salama et al., 2016) . As this may also be a feasible option for pre-pubertal girls with Turner syndrome who still have a sufficient ovarian reserve, it is recommended that all girls with this condition should be seen for expert evaluation as early as possible in their life (Oktay et al., 2016) . Given the still experimental nature of ovarian cryopreservation, it is not inconceivable that also in cases where the girl's ovarian tissue was actually cryopreserved mothers would still request FPMDD as an additional safeguard.
Current ESHRE and ASRM guidance documents for 'intrafamilial medically assisted reproduction' (IMAR) have not yet been updated so as to include FPMDD as a special form of IMAR (de Wert et al., 2011; Amato et al., 2012) . Because guidance is lacking, clinicians may feel insecure about how to respond to FPMDD requests in the light of ethical concerns. Our paper aims to help answer this question by exploring those concerns and determining whether they are prohibitive.
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we start from the conclusion of the ESHRE and ASRM documents that donation between family members is acceptable in principle. However, as we will explain, FPMDD differs from direct-donation forms of IMAR in two important respects that may raise additional ethical concerns. These pertain to the balance of benefits and harms of the fertility preservation procedure that the mother will have to undergo, and to the freedom of her later adult daughter to accept or reject her mother's gift. In two further sections, we will address these issues against the background of earlier ethical debates about comparable reproductive practices, in which relevantly similar concerns were raised: the proportionality concern in cryopreservation of oocytes for self-use, and the concern about pressure to use the oocytes in fertility preservation in minors. We reason that if these concerns do not stand in the way of regarding those comparable practices acceptable in principle, the same must hold for FPMDD. We end this paper with recommendations for assessing and handling individual FPMDD-requests, including for the legal construction of the donation procedure.
FPMDD as a special form of intergenerational IMAR
IMAR collaborations may be either intragenerational (involving family members of the same generation, for example sister-to-sister donation) or intergenerational (involving family members of different generations) donation (de Wert et al., 2011) . Reported intergenerational collaborations include aunt-to-niece oocyte donation or father-to-son sperm donation (Marshall, 1998; Nikolettos et al., 2003; Bredenoord et al., 2012) . We found no reports of immediate mother-to-daughter donation, as mothers of women with POI are usually of too advanced maternal age to allow fresh oocyte donation (Amato et al., 2012) .
According to the ASRM and ESHRE documents, IMAR is ethically acceptable under conditions of voluntary collaboration and adequate counselling also dealing with possible risks of role confusion as, e.g. the child's aunt or grandfather would at the same time be her biological parent. With the exception of child-to-parent donation (where the child's dependency may provoke a coerced rather than a voluntary collaboration), there is no reason according to these documents for considering intergenerational IMAR as generally more risky or problematic than IMAR between family members of the same generation. Both ASRM and ESHRE insist on a case-by-case assessment of the acceptability of requests for IMAR. If FPMDD can be seen as a form of (intergenerational) IMAR, raising the same issues as discussed in these documents, FPMDD would also be acceptable in principle. However, there are two important differences between FPMDD and the forms of IMAR as discussed by ASRM and ESHRE.
Firstly, in comparison with IMAR, the fact that we are dealing with a potential future need rather than an actual need affects the proportionality of the procedure (i.e. the balance between burdens and risks on the one hand and benefits on the other). After all, depending on the precise context, there may be several outcomes in which FPMDD would have been done in vain. The daughter may still be able to conceive with her own gametes, she may be able to successfully conceive with her own cryopreserved ovarian reserve, she may not find a partner with whom to have children or she may not want to have children at all. Moreover, given her medical history either as a survivor after oncology treatment (Oeffinger et al., 2006; Signorello et al., 2006; Hudson et al., 2013) or because for example having Turner syndrome (Karnis, 2012) , the daughter's higher than average pregnancy risks may lead her to abandon any reproductive plans. Further proportionality affecting factors are related to the cryopreservation procedure which inevitably entails a loss of oocytes due to freezing and thawing, and to the expectedly advanced age of the mother, which limits the number of good-quality oocytes that can be harvested. As a consequence, even if the daughter wants to make use of her mother's gift, chances that this will lead to a successful pregnancy are smaller than with 'regular' IMAR. As the burdens and risks related to the invasive procedure are the same, these factors entail that the proportionality profile of FPMDD is less favourable than that of IMAR. Against this background, the question may arise whether requests for FPMDD should be refused in order to protect mothers against themselves, more precisely against making a sacrifice for their child that may well be in vain.
Secondly, whereas in IMAR the intended recipients can reject a donation offer prior to any gametes being obtained, the recipient in the case of FPMDD (the future adult) will have to decide knowing that her mother has invested a lot in making those oocytes available. As she may feel obliged to use her mother's oocytes rather than those from another donor, or perhaps even without having a strongly felt child wish herself, there is a possible concern about voluntariness resembling ESHRE's warning about intergenerational IMAR in contexts of relational dependency. This concern was the main reason for rejecting earlier requests for FPMDD in our centres.
Although these two concerns are new to the debate about IMAR, they have been discussed in other contexts. The first concern, whether women should be protected against themselves given the uncertainty of a future need and limited effectiveness of cryopreservation, has been discussed in view of requests by women for cryopreservation of oocytes for possible future self-use. The second concern, possible pressure emerging from the fact that the oocytes have already been obtained and preserved at considerable cost, has been discussed in the context of fertility preservation for minors. We will now turn to these earlier discussions.
FPMDD and fertility preservation for self-use: should we protect women against themselves?
Requests for fertility preservation for self-use are made by women in view of threatening early fertility loss as a result of gonadotoxic treatment or of a disease that may lead to POI, or in anticipation of natural ovarian ageing. The latter is often referred to as a 'social' reason, as opposed to the supposedly 'medical reasons' of those confronted with iatrogenic of pathologic fertility loss. The case of FPMDD is interesting because it does not make an easy fit with this distinction. On the one hand, it is a form of fertility preservation requested by a reproductively healthy woman to avoid the effects of ovarian ageing, as precisely that is the reason for obtaining (and donating) oocytes now rather than at the time of a possible future reproductive need of the daughter. This makes it similar to oocyte cryopreservation for social reasons. On the other hand, the fact that this would be done to help a daughter with POI can be regarded as a medical reason, or at least an indirectly medical one.
In debates about the ethics of fertility preservation for self-use, proportionality is an important consideration. This refers to the overall balance of (i) the burdens, risks and costs needed to cryopreserve a reasonable number of oocytes and (ii) the chance that those oocytes will both be needed and successfully used for a future child wish. It has been suggested that this proportionality balance is more precarious in case of fertility preservation for age-related fertility loss than for medically indicated applications. After all, for a woman without a suitable partner at 35, things may still change, whereas iatrogenic or pathogenic fertility loss leaves a woman 'without viable options ' (SART and ASRM, 2007) . On the other hand, the scale and imminence of fertility loss due to medical intervention and disease may also be difficult to predict. The outcome of this debate has been that if fertility preservation is acceptable (or should even be offered) to enable women facing cancer treatment to have children later in life, it is difficult to maintain that fulfilling requests from those who fear the sterilizing effects of ovarian ageing would as such be disproportional (Dondorp et al., 2012) . Clearly, medical professionals have a responsibility not to raise false hopes. Nor should they go ahead with requests when very low a priori chances make the whole endeavour unrealistic from the outset. However, respect for reproductive autonomy entails that apart from such cases, and with adequate information and counselling, it is up to women themselves to decide whether the proportionality balance of fertility preservation is sufficiently positive.
If this holds for cryopreservation of oocytes for self-use, including for 'social' reasons, the same conclusion would seem to apply to requests for FPMDD, given that the burdens, risks and costs are no different, while the uncertainties about a future need are not evidently greater than in the case of women who at 35 years of age are still in search of a suitable partner. Here also, centres should provide adequate information and not go ahead with requests for FPMDD when this would most probably be futile.
Does it make a difference that FPMDD requests are altruistically motivated? Should women be protected against possible harms that may result from subordinating their own present interests to a possible future interest of their child? We do not think so. There is no reason why 'respect for autonomy' should not also apply to altruistically motivated decisions (Smajdor, 2011) . It is a misunderstanding that acting from a feeling of moral obligation would render decisions to make a personal sacrifice somehow less voluntary. If it did, the practice of e.g. living organ donation would be morally problematic as well (Crouch and Elliott, 1999) .
However, there may be concerns about the mother's motives that should be addressed prior to a decision to proceed with a FPMDD request. It may be that the mother's main drive is a wish to correct a supposed personal guilt for the abnormality that causes her daughter's infertility. Or it may be that the mother's primary motive is not to help her daughter, but the fear not to have grandchildren herself. In both cases, psychological counselling seems a better way of dealing with the problem. A further concern is that those motives would make the mother less inclined after FPMDD to accept all possible reproductive choices by her daughter. Clearly, requests for FPMDD should be rejected if the mother regards her donation as more than providing a possible reproductive option for her daughter, as in such cases the potential for harm seems considerable.
FPMDD and fertility preservation in minors; opportunity or pressure?
The problem of a built-in pressure to use cryopreserved reproductive material has been discussed in the context of decision making about fertility preservation in minors facing gonadotoxic treatment, using the child's own gametes or gonadal tissue. Although for young children the relevant options (ovarian or testicular tissue cryopreservation) are still experimental, there is a growing consensus that professionals and parents have a responsibility in such cases to consider whether reproductive material of the child should be cryopreserved for later (Wallace et al., 2016) . The argument for doing so is that without the ability to reproduce, ideally using his or her own gametes, the child would lose what in our society is considered an important life option (Jadoul et al., 2010) . However, the question has been raised if cryopreserving reproductive material would undermine the child's future autonomy by creating a moral obligation to use this material that will be difficult to ignore. Satkoske and Parker speak of 'a possible source of intense pressure, not opportunity' (Satkoske and Parker, 2013) . But as (amongst others) Quinn et al. (2012) explain, this can hardly be regarded as a categorical argument against fertility preservation in minors. A decision not to freeze means that the child will almost certainly not be able to have children with his or her own gametes. Moreover, the risk of pressure can be minimized by proper counselling including adequate expectations management.
If the risk of built-in pressure does not as such render fertility preservation in minors morally problematic, what about FPMDD? It can perhaps be argued that the chance of creating a source of pressure is greater, given the larger personal investment by the mother. Realizing that her mother has done so much for it, the future adult may feel under a moral obligation to accept her gift and use it as intended. Earlier we have said that acting under a feeling of moral obligation does not as such imply involuntariness. There is a difference between internal (moral conviction) and external pressure (ranging from manipulation to coercion), with only the latter compromising voluntary choice. However, in the context of a relation of dependency (as in child-to-parent IMAR), this distinction may be less easy to draw.
Although the pressure risk related to the mother's investment is a matter of concern, also in view of the higher than average pregnancy risks that come with the medical history of the daughter, we do not think this as such outweighs the potential benefits for the recipient. Without the mother's proactive initiative, the girl's chances of later having a child of her own will be slim, given the scarcity of oocyte donors. Moreover, the use of her mother's oocytes will (if all goes well) allow her to have a child to whom she will have a close genetic relationship.
Conclusion and recommendations
Following our analysis there is no good reason that requests for FPMDD should always be refused. The moral acceptability of FPMDD will have to be determined on a case by case basis.
Counselling for FPMDD
In addition to more general aspects raised in guidance documents pertaining to IMAR (de Wert et al., 2011) , counselling for FPMDD should address the proportionality of the procedure, the mother's motives and her willingness to fully respect her daughter's freedom to make her own reproductive decisions, with or without her mother's oocytes. Mothers considering FPMDD should be adequately informed about procedure-related burdens and risks, but also about their chances of producing a realistically sufficient amount of oocytes. See Table I for topics which we would recommend to discuss during FPMDD counselling.
Donation or custody agreement
With regard to the legal construction of FPMDD, two possibilities come into consideration. The first one entails a donation agreement specifying that the oocytes are donated by the mother to her daughter, that they are being vitrified and stored for later use by the daughter, who will have the right to use them from her 18th birthday and will from then on also be entitled to extend the preservation period for later use of the oocytes (to be renewed after for instance 5 years). Only in very exceptional circumstances should the mother be able to use the oocytes for her own reproductive treatment. As part of this agreement, the mother should also indicate what should be done with the oocytes if the daughter would not want or be able to use them, i.e. donation for research, donation to sub-or infertile women or destruction.
A second possibility would be a custody agreement on behalf of the mother. In that situation, the oocytes are preserved until donated by the mother to her adult daughter. The most important difference is that, legally, the mother remains in full control of the oocytes until the moment of donation.
We slightly prefer the first option because this leaves more discretion to the daughter and makes her less dependent of arbitrary decisions of her mother. In our opinion with this construction, the intention of the cryopreservation for possible future use by the daughter is very clear for all the parties involved. Should the mother die prematurely, posthumous donation is not necessary since the oocytes are already donated to the daughter.
Use of FPMDD oocytes
A decision to go ahead with a request for FPMDD only concerns the first part of a two-step procedure. There is still a role for professionals at the eventual stage of the daughter's request to make use of her mother's oocytes. In addition to medical aspects including the woman's predisposition to higher than average pregnancy risks, preconception counselling should also include the voluntariness of the request to make use of her mother's oocytes.
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